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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No,, ':^0 0 4 9™CA 
Priority ^ . 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAROLYN RAY 
Appe-' "^-rr '- ^ ud^^r*" =ind corvi ^  ion of Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia, . siass L m^suemearu i 
~~-."u.040 of ln^ Fa^f Lakp City Code in the Third Judicial 
District Court,
 Ane ::u:^i«: . •-^ .. " -* t Court 
Judge, presiding. 
"•HE COURT 
•~)r. December 21, 1998, Ms. Carolyn Kay entered a conar tic-na^ 
p^ec ras . r\a\ * :^ ' ^~ contest on a Class 
B misdemeanor charge of possessing drug p^^p::ernu__ 
v. . • " ?tion n . ^ ^ l ' • r the Salt lake City Code. See 
Record Pages CKR") at 83--^ .attacnea ...o -.--:_. 
1
 -. .risdiction to review appeals from tf- Third District Court 
riminal cases, excu Lotion ~f a first 
degree or capital felony, pursuant to Utan ~ode Ann. § io-2a-
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
police were able to point to objective, specific and articulable 
facts which warranted a non-consensual investigative seizure of 
Ms. Ray? This issue is a question of law that this Court reviews 
nondeferentially for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Shepard, 
955 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Humprhrev, 937 
P.2d 137, 140 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) . This issue was preserved for 
review in Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Suppress at R 18-19, 26-65. 
2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
police's detention of Ms. Ray was reasonably related in scope to 
the report of a suspicious female standing on the corner waiting 
for a ride? This issue is a question of law that this Court 
reviews nondeferentially for correctness. See, e.g., Shepard, 
955 P.2d at 354; Humprhrey, 937 P.2d at 140. This issue was 
preserved for review in Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at R. 18-19, 26-65. 
3. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
police did not seize Ms. Ray when they took her driver's license 
and retained it while the police department ran a check for 
warrants? This issue is a question of law that this Court 
reviews for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 
-2-
985 i. ' (Utah C t . App. .1.994). T h i s i s s u e wa<* p r e s e r v e d f o r 
r e v i e w i n Ms. R a y ' s I l o t i o n t<j S i i p p i e b b . * ' •• " ^ c D o r t 
of Motion to Suppress at R. 18-19, 26-65. 
4, in i in 1 mi in I i n i i n i in i i mi in mi mi i xn c o n c l u d i n g t h a t Ms. Ray 
voluntarily consented to a police search of her belongings? 
Because t:.-^  -__;__ * v f ps^-d, this issue is a 
pure question of law that tnis Court review^ under a correction 
ci t: .: ; . ^^^- -. -., Stat_e v. Thurmar., £4^ ?,2d 1256, 
1269-"" J: a: ''•; ; bean, D C ^ r.<_u ai ct . . . .. i . _• 111 * was 
piti^ t-. '• •- n Mb. Ray's Motion ^ • impress and 
Memorandum in Support, of Motion to Suppres. - ' i -hri. 
CITATION TO AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional provisions and s tat •-•!'-> M-il <w>- HI m h»-
(\- - -rminative or of central importance to r.tis appeal are as 
follows: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of tl le people ^- be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
institution, Amendment XIV: 
Section No State shall make or enforce any 
law whic:. ._.:.a abridge the privileges or immunities of 
-3-
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 29, 1998, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's office 
filed an information with the Third District Court charging Ms. 
Ray with one count of misdemeanor possession of a drug 
paraphernalia in violation of Section 11.20.040 of the Salt Lake 
City Code. See R. at 2. On August 31, 1998, Ms. Ray moved the 
Court to suppress the evidence on which the information was based 
on the ground that the Salt Lake City police officer stopped and 
detained her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 
support the stop or arrest in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
15. See R. at 15, 18-19. Ms. Ray also argued that the officers' 
actions violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
-4-
r 
Amendments to m e United States Constitution and Article T 
section 14 of the Utah (Jonsti tu I. i. un . See /< / 
Ms. Ray's Motion r, Suppress came on t : hearing before the 
Honorable Les_--. .- - — A, * -• See K. ,4_ . ~ , N -
25. After the police officers v;no interrogated, searched and 
arresl-- . * .• ~ : tnat nearing, the court requested . 
supplemental memoranda on Ms. Ray's motion *~^ suppress. 
8;' .iiTordance with t^°
 C-,->--H'C; r°auest, Ms. Ray filed 
a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supply < i Lobe' i""f 
1 Q9R, see P. at 26-o3, and an Addendum in Support of Memorandum, 
on October 22, 1998. See R. at • -: - . .: . .;. y 
prosecutor filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Ray's Motion 
to Suppress on Cotorer . , + rial 
rour4 firs4: ruled that Ms. Pciv's Motion to suppress wuuia be 
denit-a en ^cn. • . uie court signed 
written Findinas of Fact and Conciusjons o: Law to that eirect on 
NoveiPit an Oru-^r f^r™aliv denying 
the motion or. November *u, i^^b. Sue P. -.4 - . ^rsuan:. \. i . e 
• Criminal Procedure Ms. Ray entered a 




 ie trial court entered a Sentence, Judgment, Commit merit 
Order on tnat same day 5^^ F ' Jm- 1" 
>-•* : -2 of appeal on January 7, 1999. See R. at 91-92. 
STATEMEft i i ACTS 
-5-
This case presents a practical reality of police-citizen 
interaction: when the police have confiscated and retained a 
person's driver's license, official identification card, or other 
important papers to run a check for outstanding warrants, the 
average reasonable person does not feel that they are free to 
walk away until the officers complete the warrants check and 
return their papers. 
On May 27, 1998, Ms. Carolyn L. Ray purchased several items 
at the Quality Quick Stop convenience store in Salt Lake City. 
See Transcript of October 6, 1998 Hearing ("Transcript") at 9.1 
After completing her purchases, Ms. Ray waited in front of the 
store for a prearranged ride. See id. at 3. Ms. Ray's ride did 
not come for some time, so she continued to wait outside the 
store for approximately two hours. See id at 3, 16. Rather than 
questioning Ms. Ray about her reasons for waiting outside the 
store or asking Ms. Ray to leave, the store manager then called 
the police to report that Ms. Ray was "suspicious." See id. at 
3, 9-10, 15, 26-27. 
1
 The appellate record contains a transcript of the hearing 
on Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress conducted before Judge Lewis on 
October 6, 1998. A stamp on the transcript indicates that it was 
received by this Court on March 23, 1999. However, the 
transcript has not been numbered as part of the appellate 
record's consecutive numbering. Accordingly, for clarity this 
brief will refer to the original page numbers indicated on the 
transcript. 
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Salt Lake City Police officers Jones and Eldard both 
responded to the store manage: .- iei . . . : -p-~. - -
See xu. at 3-- Officer Eldard arrived at tne store first ana 
saw Ms , Pav, _ -..-.,•-. - ~ - ~
 t 
carrying a gun, and in a marked patrol car. ,\>'ee id. at 10-11. 
At a IdleL liedj Lin i i in * * i".) suppress, Officers 
Eldard and Jones both aamitted that Ms. Ray was committing no 
crime '-a and did not appear to have recently 
committed a crime or to be i ^  f K o a c : if prepari:ir; _ . • . 
See at ±u-±j.f ^ x . tfhi *-- + ' - r^-*--- ranaaer told the 
dispatcher that he suspecte^ , - * *• «- f 
illegal drugsf see id. a: *- :::d later testified that r.e held 
that suspicion at the lime :.-_- -.;..•. . . - -•, 
he ci1 ( n r '-ommunicate that or any other particularized 
suspicions • . . - "J Officers 
Eldard or Jones. See id. at r . 19-^.0, :c. 
(::... : • v * - ' i ,; • ':\~y and asked her to produce 
her identification. :ee la I In Pay gave Officer Eldaid 
. , .
 i; -*•-,-..- . dentification card, whi^h *' -ficer Eldard reviewed 
and then retained as he contactea nis r ; . . . . . - : -Ft 
a check for outstandi ng warrants. See id. , 11-12 
As Officer ;i .i .. waited IMI • ::----f for a 
warrants check, Officer Jones, who was also in uniform ana :~ ^ 
markea par- * : .ick Stop. See ia. at 
-7-
12, 20. Officer Jones began interrogating Ms. Ray, asking if she 
had anything in her bags that she shouldn't have. See id. at 5, 
16, 21-22. Ms. Ray responded that she did not. See id. Officer 
Jones then asked if he could look in Ms. Ray's bags and she gave 
him permission. See id. Officer Jones then searched Ms. Ray's 
bags, producing two spoons wrapped in plastic with burn marks on 
the bottom and two syringes. See id. at 6, 17. Officer Jones 
placed Ms. Ray under arrest and searched her person incident to 
that arrest, revealing a glass pipe with a filter in one end. 
See id. at 7. Ms. Ray denied that the items were hers. See id. 
at 18. The officers cited Ms. Ray for misdemeanor possession of 
drug paraphernalia in violation of section 11.20.040 of the Salt 
Lake City Code and released her. See id. at 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both Utah and Federal law recognize that Officer Eldard 
seized Ms. Ray when he took her driver's license and retained it 
to run a non-consensual search for outstanding warrants. Utah 
law also recognizes that Officer Eldard's actions would have 
constituted a seizure of Ms. Ray even if he had not retained her 
license because a reasonable person does not feel free to walk 
away when a police officer requests a warrants check and is 
obviously waiting for the results of the check. While requesting 
a warrants check and requiring the suspect to remain to learn its 
results is permissible if the police have a reasonable, 
-8-
articulable suspicion that the suspect has or is about to commit 
a crime, the record in this case is devoid of any facts known to 
the officers which would create such a reasonable suspicion. 
Since officers improperly seized Ms. Ray without any 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that she had or was about to 
commit a crime, the law holds that the officers may not rely on 
the consent to search that they obtained during the period of the 
illegal detention. Accordingly, since the officers' search of 
Ms. Ray violated her state and federal constitutional rights, the 
trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence that was 
the fruit of that illegal search. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Officers' Search of Ms. Ray Viola-bed the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Because the 
Officers Could Not Point to Objective, Specific and 
Articulable Facts Which Warranted Their Non-consensual 
Investigative Seizure of Ms. Ray. 
A. Officer Eldard Seized Ms. Ray When He Took Her 
Identification and Retained It. 
The Utah courts have established a three-level analytic 
framework for analyzing police encounters with the public. In a 
level one encounter, "an officer may approach a citizen at [any 
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). In a level two encounter, "an officer may seize a 
-9-
person if the officer has an ^articulable suspicion' that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 
^detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id. In a level three 
encounter, "an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is 
being committed." Id. 
In State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), this Court clarified the distinction between a level one 
encounter (a consensual encounter) and level two encounter (a 
seizure requiring an objectively reasonable and articulable 
suspicion). This Court stated that "[t]he distinction between a 
level one encounter . . . and a level two encounter . . . depends 
on whether, through a show of physical force or authority, a 
person believes his freedom of movement is restrained." Id. 
This Court emphasized that this is an objective test: "[A] 
seizure occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave." Id. This Court has also 
cautioned that this test for determining when a person is seized 
is judged from the point of view of the average, reasonable 
citizen, not from the police officer's point of view: "The test 
for when [a] seizure occur[s] is objective and depends on when 
the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police 
-10-
officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave." Bean, 869 
P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991)). 
Applying this objective test to this case, it is clear that 
Officer Eldard effectuated a level two encounter before Officer 
Jones even arrived at the Quality Quick Stop. When Officer 
Eldard arrived, Ms. Ray was waiting outside the store. See 
Transcript at 4. Although both Officer Eldard and Officer Jones 
admitted that Ms. Ray was committing no crime when they arrived 
and did not appear to have recently committed a crime or to be in 
the act of preparing for a crime, see id. at 10-11, 21, Officer 
Eldard immediately asked Ms. Ray to produce her identification 
then kept that identification while his dispatcher ran a search 
for outstanding warrants. See id. at 4-5. At the hearing on Ms. 
Ray's motion to suppress, Officer Eldard did not testify that he 
obtained Ms. Ray's consent to retain her identification or to 
wait while he ran a warrants check. See id. He simply 
approached Ms. Ray in full police uniform, asked her to produce 
her identification, and then retained that identification without 
any further consent from Ms. Ray. See id. 
It is well-established under both Utah and federal law that 
Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray at the moment he elected to retain 
her identification to run an involuntary warrants check. Courts 
have universally recognized that, when a police officer 
-11-
confiscates and retains a person's identification or other 
important documents, the person is seized because a reasonable 
person does not feel that she is free to walk away and leave her 
documents with the officer. See, e.g., Florida v. Rover, 460 
U.S. 491, 501-03 (1983); United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1040 
(10th Cir.1996); Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1068; United States v. 
Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990). Rather, as this 
Court has stated, a reasonable person feels that she is "not free 
to leave" when an officer confiscates and "continue[s] to hold 
[her] papers." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
The Tenth Circuit has recently reemphasized this rule, 
stating that: 
In Terry stops and routine traffic stops, courts have 
consistently held that undue retention of a defendant's 
documents renders the encounter nonconsensual. See 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-03, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. McKneelv, 6 
F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993). In a Terry stop or 
routine traffic stop, an officer's retention of a 
defendant's documents is significant because it 
indicates that the defendant, as a general rule, did 
not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter 
and, therefore, the government cannot rely on the 
defendant's consent to justify further detention, 
questioning, or a search. 
State v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998). Accord 
United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1992) 
(stating that, in Florida v. Rover, the United States Supreme 
Court "recognized that abandoning one's driver's license . . . is 
-12-
simply not a practical or realistic option"); United States v. 
Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir.1991) ("[T]he encounter in 
this case was clearly not consensual. Officer Graham retained 
the defendant's driver's license and registration during the 
entire time he questioned the defendant."); United States v. 
Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
seizure occurred when a police officer handed a defendant's 
license and ticket to another officer and continued questioning 
the defendant); United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359 
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that police questioning of a person 
while in his car "matured into" a seizure when the police 
retained the defendant's driver's license after examining it); 
United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 660 (11th Cir. 1983) ("We 
fail to see how appellant could have felt free to walk away from 
police officers when they still possessed [his ticket and 
driver's license]."). 
In Jordan, the D.C. Circuit noted the universal recognition 
of this rule, stating that the D.C. Circuit has 
considered on several occasions the effect on citizens 
stopped by the police of being asked to hand over 
critical identification or travel documents and having 
the police retain them while questioning ensues, noting 
that xonce the identification is handed over to police 
and they have had a reasonable opportunity to review 
it, if the identification is not returned to the 
detainee [it is] difficult to imagine that any 
reasonable person would feel free to leave without it.' 
-13-
Jordan, 958 F.2d at 1087 (quoting United States v. Battista, 876 
F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
In the initial hearing on Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress, 
Officer Eldard recognized the reality on police-citizen 
interaction that underlies these decisions from the Utah and 
Federal courts. In response to a query whether Ms. Ray was free 
to leave while Officer Eldard held her identification, Officer 
Eldard responded "I guess the fact that I had her I.D. might have 
caused her to wait." See Transcript at 12. 
In this case, a reasonable person in Ms. Ray's position 
would not have felt that she was free to leave while Officer 
Eldard retained possession of their her identification. 
Accordingly, as Utah and federal courts have recognized, Officer 
Eldard seized Ms. Ray when he retained her identification after 
briefly examining it. 
B. Even if Officer Eldard Had Not Taken and Retained Ms. 
Ray's Identification, His Actions Would Still Amount to 
a Seizure of Her Person Because an Average, Reasonable 
Person Would Not Feel Free to Walk Away While an 
Officer was Conducting a Check for Outstanding 
Warrants. 
In determining whether a person has been seized by police 
conduct, both Utah and federal courts consider the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen interaction. 
See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) 
(holding that a person is seized if "in view of all of the 
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circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave."); State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1991); Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655. 
Under that standard, Officer Eldard's retention of Ms. Ray's 
identification was not the only action which seized Ms. Ray. He 
also seized her when he initiated an involuntary check for 
outstanding warrants. 
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762, the Utah Supreme Court 
agreed with this Court's conclusion that "a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred *when [an officer] took 
[a defendant's] name and birth date and expected her to wait 
while he ran a warrants check." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). This rule is simply a 
straightforward application of the test for determining when a 
person is seized. An objective, reasonable person would simply 
not feel that they are free to end their encounter with a police 
officer and depart when the officer has requested a check for 
outstanding warrants and is obviously waiting for the results of 
that check. See, e.g., Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762; State v. 
Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a trial 
court's conclusion that running a warrants check did not 
constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
Of course, police officers are justified in running a check 
for outstanding warrants and requiring the suspect to remain for 
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a reasonable time when they are involved in a level two 
encounter. The Utah courts have held that, once a level two stop 
is made, "the detention xmust be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.''' Salt 
Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)). Under 
this standard, "running a warrants check does not exceed the 
scope of the [level two] detention yso long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary' . . . to effectuate the purpose of the 
initial stop." Id. (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133). However, 
as discussed in the following section, the record demonstrates 
that Officers Eldard and Jones did not have a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Ms. Ray had been or was about to be 
involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., Transcript at 10-11, 
21. Accordingly, Officer Eldard's decision to seize Ms. Ray 
violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Officer Eldard's actions also violated Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15. 
C. The Record is Devoid of Any Indication that Officers 
Jones and Eldard Knew Any Objective, Articulable Facts 
on Which to Base a Reasonable Suspicion at the Time 
Officer Eldard Seized Ms. Ray. 
Office Eldard's level two seizure of Ms. Ray would have been 
justifiable if he were aware of sufficient objective, articulable 
-16-
facts to give rise to a reasonable suspicion before he effected 
the seizure. Both Utah and federal courts have held that an 
officer may effectuate a level two seizure if he is able to point 
to specific, objective and articulable facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that the defendant has or is about 
to commit a crime. See, e.g., Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617. 
However, the record is devoid of any indication that either 
Officer Eldard or Officer Jones were aware of any such objective, 
articulable facts prior to the time Officer Eldard confiscated 
Ms. Ray's identification and initiated a warrants check. In 
fact, the only facts that the officers knew at the time Officer 
Eldard seized Ms. Ray were (1) that the store manager had 
reported that a "suspicious" female had waited outside the store 
for two hours after making some purchases, and (2) that Officer 
Eldard had seen Ms. Ray standing in front of the store, and (3) 
that Ms. Ray appeared "nervous" when a fully uniformed police 
officer with a marked police car and gun approached her and began 
to ask her questions. See Transcript at 3-5, 8-10. Of course, a 
person's feeling that a suspect is "suspicious" or their 
knowledge that a person has waited in a public place for two 
hours is not sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655 ("a 
hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable 
suspicion regardless of the final result"). If it were, the 
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police would be able to require any person who stands in the same 
place for too long to surrender their identification and wait 
while the police ran a check for warrants. Moreover, this Court 
has held that "the fact that [a] defendant[] [appears] nervous 
does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. 
Accordingly, the facts that the officers knew at the time Officer 
Eldard seized Ms. Ray are not sufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
As noted above, Officers Eldard and Jones admitted that Ms. 
Ray was committing no crime when they arrived and did not appear 
to have recently committed a crime or to be in the act of 
preparing for a crime. See Transcript at 10-11, 21. The record 
shows that Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray immediately after his 
arrival, when he took and retained her identification. See id. 
at 4. It is therefore clear that Officer Eldard was not aware of 
any objective, articulable facts to support a reasonable 
suspicion that Ms. Ray had or was about to commit a crime at the 
time he effected a level two seizure of her person. 
D. Because the Officers Improperly Seized Ms. Ray Without 
Any Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That She Had or 
Was about to Commit a Crime, the Officers May Not Rely 
on the Consent to Search That They Obtained During the 
Period of the Illegal Detention. 
Although Ms. Ray consented to a search of her property, she 
gave that consent after Officer Eldard took and retained her 
license and after he initiated the warrants check. See 
-18-
Transcript at 3-5. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Ms. 
Ray's consent was therefore obtained during an illegal detention. 
This Court has previously stated that, "to be 
constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal police 
behavior must be both non-coerced and not arrived at by 
exploitation of the primary police illegality." State v. Sims, 
808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993). Because Ms. Ray's consent to 
search her bags was obtained during an unconstitutional 
detention, the government bears this heavy burden of showing that 
"the consent was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by 
exploitation of the prior illegality." Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 
655. "Evidence obtained in searches following police illegality 
must meet both tests to be admissible." State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). See also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1262-63. 
1. Officer Jones' Search of Ms. Ray Exploited Officer 
Eldard's Prior Illegal Seizure of Her Person. 
"The principle underlying the exploitation test is that the 
Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to Aratify 
their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred.'" Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689) . "The factors to be* considered in an 
exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the 
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illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct." Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655. See also Thurman, 
846 P.2d at 1262. In this case, those factors clearly 
demonstrate that the police exploited Ms. Ray's illegal detention 
to obtain her consent to search. First, the temporal proximity 
of the illegal seizure and Ms. Ray's grant of consent to search 
her bags was immediate. The record shows that Officer Eldard had 
taken Ms. Ray's driver's license and was in the act of running 
the check for warrants when Officer Jones began interrogating her 
and then asked for consent to search. See Transcript at 3-5, 11-
12, 20. There was no lapse in time between the illegal seizure 
of Ms. Ray's person and the request for consent to search--in 
fact, that seizure had just occurred and was ongoing. See id. 
Second, as one would expect with such close temporal 
proximity between the illegal police conduct and the request for 
consent, the record contains no references to any intervening 
circumstances which would purge the request for consent of its 
illegal taint. In fact, the only circumstance that occurred 
between Officer Eldard's seizure of Ms. Ray and her grant of 
consent to search was the arrival of a second uniformed officer 
in a marked police car and the initiation of an interrogation. 
See Transcript at 20. This intervening circumstance only 
aggravated the illegality of Ms. Ray's seizure: she certainly did 
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not feel "free to go" when Officer Jones was interrogating her 
and Officer Eldard had her license and was running a check for 
warrants. 
Finally, the "purpose" of Officer Eldard's seizure of Ms. 
Ray was clearly to detain her while the officers searched every 
avenue to find some inculpatory evidence against her. The 
officers admitted that Ms. Ray had not committed a crime when 
they arrived at the Quality Quick Stop and that there was no 
indication of pending or past illegality. See Transcript at 10-
11, 21. In fact, Officer Eldard testified that his sole purpose 
in going to the Quality Quick Stop was to find out why Ms. Ray 
was waiting in front of the store after purchasing her items. 
See Transcript at 10. The government does not contend that Ms. 
Ray's waiting in a public place was illegal, and the police 
therefore were investigating perfectly legal citizen conduct. 
The officers' detention of Ms. Ray while they ran a warrants 
check were therefore a fishing expedition for evidence of some 
crime that Ms. Ray may have committed at some time. The 
"purpose and flagrancy" factor [of the exploitation test] 
directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 608-12 (Powell, J., concurring)). Given the fact that the 
Utah and federal courts have clearly ruled on several occasions 
that the police may not retain a citizen's identification in a 
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level two seizure without reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
has or is about to commit a crime, and given the fact that the 
officers' conduct in this case directly violated those rulings, 
the evidence seized in this case must be suppressed to send a 
clear deterrent message; the police may not ignore this court's 
rulings and hope that a subsequent consent to search will 
validate their illegal actions. 
For the foregoing reasons, the government has failed to meet 
its burden of showing that the consent that the officers obtained 
from Ms. Ray did not exploit her prior illegal detention. Since 
the government must show both that the consent was involuntary 
and that it did not exploit their prior illegal conduct, see 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 656; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688, the trial 
court's denial of Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress should be reversed 
on this point alone. 
2. Ms. Ray's Consent to Search was not Voluntarily 
Given. 
While the police officers' exploitation of Ms. Ray's seizure 
is sufficient alone to merit a reversal of the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling should also be reversed because the 
government cannot show that Ms. Ray's consent to search was 
voluntary. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1262 ("If the court determines that 
the consent was not voluntary, no further analysis is required: 
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the consent is invalid, and the proffered evidence must be 
excluded."). 
"Voluntariness is primarily a factual question." Id. 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)). 
Accordingly, while a trial court's ultimate conclusion that a 
consent was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed nondeferentially 
for correctness, a trial court's underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
Id. at 1271. "[W]hether the requisite voluntariness exists 
depends on xthe totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of police conduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226). 
In this case, a number of facts and circumstances point to a 
conclusion that Ms. Ray's consent to search her bags was not 
voluntarily given. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, 
Officer Eldard seized Ms. Ray by confiscating and retaining her 
identification prior to the time that Officer Jones obtained her 
consent to search. The Utah Supreme Court has said that the 
prosecution's burden of showing voluntariness "is ^particularly 
heavy' when the defendant's consent was obtained while he or she 
was in custody." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 1993). 
While the fact that Ms. Ray had been seized is not enough, 
standing alone, to reach the conclusion that her consent to 
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search was involuntary, see id., the record also shows that the 
officers used an unusual show of force in responding to a report 
of a woman waiting in a public area. Such a show of force is a 
factor in concluding that the police obtained a consent to search 
by duress or coercion. See, e.g., State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). As noted above, Officer Eldard 
was the first officer to arrive at the Quality Quick Stop. See 
Transcript at 3-5, 20. He approached Ms. Ray and began to 
question her. See id. at 3-5. Officer Eldard was wearing what 
he described as a "[b]adge, gun, the whole works." Id. at 11. 
Officer Eldard took Ms. Ray's identification and called for a 
warrants check, see id. at 3-5, which surely must have frightened 
Ms. Ray and led her to believe that she was in trouble. 
Immediately thereafter, Officer Jones arrived in a marked police 
car. He also approached Ms. Ray and began questioning her. See 
id. at 21-22. In these circumstances, the officers' 
assertiveness and the presence of their marked cars, uniforms and 
guns, together with their questioning, confiscation of Ms. Ray's 
identification and initiation of a warrants check, created a 
clear atmosphere of coerciveness that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that she was not free to decline an officer's 
request to search her belongings. 
The evidence obtained by Officer Jones while searching Ms. 
Ray's bags should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 399 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong 
Sun v. United States, 372 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). See also Lee, 73 
F.3d at 1040 ("In this case, Deputy Barney possessed Mr. Lee's 
driver's license and Mr. Lacy's identification card and rental 
documents at the time he asked permission to search the vehicle. 
Therefore, Deputy Barney's request to search the car was not a 
consensual encounter because the Defendants Awould not reasonably 
have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter' 
with Deputy Barney because their documents had not been 
returned.") (quoting Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1068). Accordingly, the 
trial court's denial of Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in holding 
that the police did not violate Ms. Ray's state and federal 
constitutional rights. This Court should reverse and remand with 
instructions to grant Ms. Ray's Motion to Suppress. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT k 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
t; • 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN L RAY, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMT] 
Case No: 981910831 MO 
Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 
Date: December 21, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: DON WARNER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JEFFREY W. HALL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 19, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:21 am 
CHARGES 
1. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 12/21/1998 No Contest 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendants conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
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Case No: 981910831 
Date: Dec 21, 1998 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of the following: 
USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA MB the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 6 month (s) The total time suspended for 
this case is 6 month(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This case is consecutive to Judge Thome and Judge Quinn cases. 
Total Fine: $171.13 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $145.46 
Total Amount Due: $316.59 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by ALCOHOL COUNSELING ED CENTER. 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 171.13 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
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Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent amy place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Pay $300.00 recoupment fee. Payments to be determined by ACEC. 
Obtain GED. 
Complete Ave Day program. 
HIV testing within 30 days. 
Be drug tested today. Random drug testing 1 time per week. 
Read AA Big Book in 6 months. 
Attend 2 AA meetings per week for duration of probation, in 
addition to the day program. 
Can have 2 years to pay fine. 
Robert Eldard, Kevin Jones, and Rory Boehner proffer their 
testimony. The Court orders a $1,000.00 fine plus am 85% surcharge 
to be paid. The fine is stayed pending successful completion of 
probation. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/25/1999 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Dated this 3\ day of V > ^ 1SL J ffifc yS? ' . 
LESLIE LEWIS r : {\-\<CL 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
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